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Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue: Tax Credits, Religious 




Oral arguments are scheduled for April 6, 2018, at 9:30 am at the George 
Dennison Theater on the University of Montana campus, Missoula, 
Montana. An introduction to the oral argument will begin at 9:00 am. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 This case presents the issue of whether a tax credit program can 
reimburse scholarship donors when the resulting scholarships can be used 
for religious schools under 1) Article X, section 6 of the Montana 
Constitution and 2) the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 In 2015, the Montana Legislature created a tax credit program 
supporting scholarships for private schools.1 The program “provides a 
one-to-one repayment, credited against a donor’s tax liability, of donations 
up to $150 to a school scholarship organization.”2 To make the program 
possible, the Legislature reserved $3 million in funding in 2016.3 When 
the funding limit is met for a year, the aggregate amount increases by 10% 
in the following year.4  
Taxpayers use the program as follows: first, a taxpayer makes a 
charitable donation to a Student Scholarship Organization (SSO).5 The 
program then allows the taxpayer to claim a tax credit for up to $150 on 
their tax return.6 Next, a parent or guardian who wants to send their child 
to a qualified education provider selects the school of their choice.7 
Finally, the SSO delivers the scholarship funds directly to the chosen 
school.8 
Many potential beneficiaries of this tax credit program are private 
religious schools.9 Article X, section 6 of the Montana Constitution states, 
                                                          
1 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1, Espinoza v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2017-0492%20Appellant's%20Opening%20--
%20Brief?id={B0C7E45F-0000-C611-84AC-44DAEDCA7391} (Mont. Feb. 2, 2018) (No. DA 17-
0492). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 6. 
4 MONT. CODE ANN. § 15–30–3111 (Temporary) (2017); see also Education Donations Portal, FAQ, 
montana.gov, http://svc.mt.gov/dor/educationdonations/SSOHelp.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2018). 




9 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 1. 
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in pertinent part, that “[t]he legislature . . . shall not make any direct or 
indirect appropriation or payment from any public fund or monies . . . for 
any sectarian purpose or to aid any church, school, academy, seminary, 
college, university, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled in 
whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination.”10  
To avoid indirect state funding of religious institutions, the 
Montana Department of Revenue (Appellants) enacted “Rule 1,” which 
excludes scholarship tax credit for religious schools from the program.11 
Plaintiff-Appellees are low-income families who wanted to apply for aid 
from SSOs whose donors are eligible for the credit to help their children 
attend religious private schools.12 The Plaintiffs sued, alleging that Rule 1 
discriminates against families who want to use scholarships created 
through this program for religious rather than secular private schools.13 
Montana’s Eleventh Judicial District Court found Rule 1 invalid because 
“appropriation” under the Montana Constitution does not specifically 
encompass tax credits.14 The Montana Department of Revenue appealed.  
III. ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Appellant  
The Appellant argues that Article X, section 6 of the Montana 
Constitution does not allow state aid, however indirect, to assist religious 
education.15 Appellant argues that payments under this program would 
be unconstitutional indirect aid because these payments go directly to 
religious schools, not to families.16 Appellant also states “the Legislature 
attached an extraordinary ‘constitutional proviso’ requiring the 
Department of Revenue to administer the tax credit in compliance with 
the Montana Constitution’s strict prohibition on aid to religious 
schools.”17 Further, the Legislature specifically amended the bill to 
include the proviso before the governor signed it into law—at the time 
the bill became law, Appellant contends the Legislature’s intent was to 
                                                          
10 MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6(1).  
11 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 1. 
12 Appellee’s Response Brief at 1, Espinoza v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2017-0492%20Appellee's%20Response%20--
%20Brief?id={80901E61-0000-CD18-891B-5F66AC5EE9CE} (Mont. Jan. 19, 2018) (No. DA 17-
0492). 
13 Id.  
14 Id. at 4. 
15 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 2. 
16 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 6–7, Espinoza v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2017-0492%20Appellant%20Reply%20--
%20Brief?id={202D8B61-0000-C523-B849-3D7D53CF3051} (Mont. Feb. 12, 2018) (No. DA17-
0492). 
17 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 1. 




address the problem of unconstitutional indirect aid. Because of this, 
Appellant created Rule 1.18  
Rule 1 disqualifies educational facilities and personnel associated 
with religious institutions from the program.19 It also specifically excludes 
facilities accredited by religious organizations.20 Appellant clarifies that 
scholarships and other tax exemptions for religious schools are not 
impacted; they merely cannot take advantage of the state-funded tax credit 
program.21 Although a legislative poll later determined Rule 1 contrary to 
legislative intent, Appellant held a public hearing in regard to Rule 1 and 
concluded that without Rule 1, “the primary effect of the tax-credit 
program would be to provide aid to religious schools.”22 Appellant cites 
data suggesting that nearly 90% of program beneficiaries would be 
religiously affiliated schools and concludes it would be unconstitutional to 
grant such aid.23  
Appellant also argues Rule 1 does not violate the Free Exercise 
Clause under the United States Constitution because it does not prohibit 
general scholarship or tax exemptions for religious institutions.24 
Appellant states Rule 1 is a narrowly tailored response to a constitutional 
conflict with the Montana and United States Constitutions, and does not 
implicate Plaintiffs’ free exercise rights.25 The religious beliefs of students 
and donors do not restrict aid to individuals under the program; restriction 
occurs only if the aid goes to religious institutions.26 As for the Montana 
Constitution, Appellant states that it “equally protects all Montanans from 
supporting state funding of religious exercise or education in their 
name.”27  
B. Appellee 
Appellee argues that Article X, section 6 of the Montana 
Constitution does not bar donors for religious school scholarships from the 
program because the program does not fall under its purview.28 Appellee 
states the tax credit program does not use “direct or indirect” state funds 
for religious school aid, but rather “the private donations of individuals 
and businesses, given freely in exchange for tax credits.”29 Further, even 
                                                          
18 Id. at 6, 32–33. 
19 Id at 8. 
20 Id.  
21 Id. at 8–9. 
22 Id. at 10. 
23 Id. at 10, 12. 
24 Id. at 36–37. 
25 Id. at 38. 
26 Id. at 39. 
27 Id. at 40. 
28 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 12, at 11. 
29 Id. at 12. 
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if state funds were used, those funds benefit individuals rather than 
religious institutions.30 
Appellee also contends that the Establishment Clause of the 
United States Constitution is not violated by tax credits for religious 
education scholarship.31 Appellee cites United States Supreme Court 
decisions that, under the test in Lemon v. Kurtzman,32 upheld scholarship 
programs for students wishing to attend religious schools.33 Appellee 
emphasizes that if a program does not have the effect or purpose of 
advancing religion and only provides neutral aid to education, it does not 
violate the Establishment Clause.34 
Finally, Appellee argues that Rule 1 violates the Free Exercise 
Clause of the United States Constitution.35 Appellee states that because 
Rule 1 only allows scholarship students to attend secular schools and 
excludes religious ones, it is not neutral toward religion.36 Under Rule 1, 
Appellee contends that students are forced to choose between attending a 
scholarship-eligible secular private school or attending a school 
correlating with their religious beliefs.37 Donors funding scholarships for 
religious schools are not eligible for the tax credit under the program.38 
Appellee further urges that the state interest in not paying for religious 
training “is not implicated by a financial aid program for elementary and 
secondary students.”39 
IV. ANALYSIS  
 
A. Montana Constitutionality 
The issue under the Montana Constitution hinges on 1) whether 
tax credits constitute state aid, and 2) if so, whether such aid constitutes a 
sectarian purpose or funds religious institutions. If the Court upholds Rule 
1, tax credits are a form of state aid, and Rule 1 is necessary to make the 
program constitutional. If the Court finds that tax credits are not state aid, 
Rule 1 is unnecessary and invalid. Because the state sets aside funds to 
make the tax credits possible, and the monetary benefit of this funding runs 
ultimately to private schools, the Court will probably find Rule 1 necessary 
to prohibit an indirect state payment to religious schools. 
                                                          
30 Id.  
31 Id. at 29. 
32 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
33 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 12, at 29–30 (citing Gaddy v. Georgia Dep’t of Revenue, 
802 S.E.2d 225, 230 (Ga. 2017), where the Court held that despite a similar constitutional provision 
to Montana’s, tax expenditures were not appropriations; McCall v. 
Scott, 199 So.3d 359, 370 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), where the court held that tax credits were not state 
funds, but another kind of support). 
34 Id. at 30. 
35 Id. at 33. 
36 Id. at 34. 
37 Id. at 35–36. 
38 Id. at 8–9. 
39 Id. at 38. 




The tax credit program at issue allows a taxpayer or corporation 
to take a tax credit of up to $150 when the individual or entity donates to 
a student scholarship organization.40 Such organizations may provide 
money to students who wish to attend religious schools for their general 
primary and secondary education.41 The funds going to those schools—
through the scholarships granted to students—come from the donors, who 
in turn can take a tax credit to offset their own tax liability.42 
The issue of whether a tax credit constitutes state aid is 
complicated and crucial to the present case. Because tax credits are given 
to individual donors to offset their tax liability, they are never realized in 
the state treasury, so the Appellee argues these credits are not public 
funds.43 Appellee further argues that, under the language of Article X, 
section 6, the tax program does not provide aid to religious schools, but 
instead to families in a similar fashion to food stamps.44 Conversely, 
Appellant argues the intent of Article X, section 6 was to strictly prohibit 
any indirect assistance to religious schools, including assistance in the 
form of tax credits.45  
While scholarship funds reach the school a student chooses to 
attend, the state’s funds themselves are not used. Rather, tax credits 
represent potential revenue for the state that it chooses to forego when 
taxpayers elect to make scholarship donations. These tax credits reduce 
the state’s general tax revenue.46 By giving tax credits to scholarship 
donors whose donations run to eligible schools, this program indirectly 
aids those schools which, without Rule 1, would include schools affiliated 
with religious institutions. If the Court finds that tax credits are 
encompassed by Article X, section 6 in the words “appropriation or 
payment from any public fund or monies,” Rule 1 will likely be upheld 
under the Montana Constitution. If, however, tax credits do not fit the 
language of the statute, Rule 1 is inapplicable.  
If tax credits do not constitute state aid, the issue of whether the 
aid runs to religious organizations is not implicated. If tax credits are state 
aid, they do, however indirectly, appear to provide monetary benefit to 
private religious schools. The delegates for the Montana Constitutional 
Convention in 1972 expressed concern about indirect state funding of 
religious education and specifically placed the word “indirect” in Article 
                                                          
40 § 15–30–3111 (Temporary) 
41 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 1; Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 12, at 1. 
42 § 15–30–3111 (Temporary); see also Mont. Dept. of Revenue, Student Scholarship Organization 
Credit, mtrevenue.gov, https://mtrevenue.gov/taxes/tax-incentives/student-scholarship-organization-
credit/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).  
43 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 12, at 14, 20. 
44 Id. at 22–23. 
45 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 16, at 16–17. 
46 Id. at 8. 
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X, section 6.47 The Montana constitutional issue in this case thus depends 
on the categorization of tax credits. 
B. Federal Constitutionality 
 The primary federal issues in this case are 1) whether the tax 
program, without Rule 1, would violate the Establishment Clause, and 2) 
whether Rule 1 violates the Free Exercise Clause. 
Under the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution, 
the legislature shall “make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion.”48 Here, the tax credit program does not explicitly favor religious 
schools, although absent Rule 1, it could be used to help students pay for 
tuition at such schools. Appellant posits that without Rule 1, the program 
would serve to favor religious schools because over half of eligible schools 
would be religiously affiliated; therefore, the primary effect of the program 
would be to aid religious schools.49 The Montana Legislature provided a 
constitutional proviso for the tax-credit program.50 The intent of the 
Legislature at the time the bill was drafted appears to comport with 
Appellant’s rationale for creating Rule 1, although the legislative poll now 
calls that intent into question.51 Whether this program, absent Rule 1, 
compels state funding for religious institutions depends on the nature of 
the tax credits at issue. 
 In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, the 
United States Supreme Court held that a state does not violate the 
Establishment Clause when it confers a public benefit neutrally to both 
religious and nonreligious entities.52 However, when a state refuses to 
confer a public benefit to religious entities solely because of their religious 
nature, absent a compelling state interest, the state violates the Free 
Exercise Clause.53 The Ace Scholarships amicus brief in support of 
Appellee states the program is a public benefit program like in Trinity.54 
Appellee argues that absent a state interest “of the highest order,” 
withholding such a public benefit infringes on the free exercise of 
religion.55 The public benefit program in Trinity, which was used to 
improve a preschool playground, was unrelated to the religious affiliation 
                                                          
47 ACLU Amicus Brief at 5, Espinoza v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2017-0492%20Amicus%20--
%20Brief?id={303DE05F-0000-C624-A715-77D61F6E8297} (Mont. Nov. 21, 2017) (No. DA 17-
0492). 
48 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
49 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 16, at 10–11; see also Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious 
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 776 (1973). 
50 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 1. 
51 Id. at 9–10. 
52 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021 (2017). 
53 Id. at 2024. 
54 Id. at 2019; Ace Scholarships Amicus Brief at 20–21, Espinoza v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2017-0492%20Amicus%20--
%20Brief?id={90D41061-0000-CF12-82B2-5E5EADF62732} (Jan. 19, 2018) (No. DA17-0492).  
55 Ace Scholarships Amicus Brief, supra note 53, at 20–21. 




of the beneficiary.56 Of interest in Trinity is the concurrence, which states 
“[p]ublic benefits come in many shapes and sizes.”57 At issue here is a 
scholarship program that includes private schools.  
The ambiguity of what constitutes a public benefit makes 
comparisons between Trinity and the instant case murky. Here, the public 
benefit is a parent’s choice of school for his or her child. This benefit 
differs from the health and safety concerns of the program in Trinity, 
although the Court did not explicitly make those concerns a requirement.58 
If the Montana Supreme Court finds that choice of private school is a 
public benefit, this will expand the scope of what constitutes a public 
benefit in Montana. Because public schools are more likely to constitute a 
public benefit, it is unlikely the Court will find that private schools fall 
into the same category. 
The United States amicus brief supporting Appellee states that 
because students apply for these scholarships to pay for general education 
rather than religious degrees, Rule 1 discriminates against free exercise of 
religion.59 If the tax credit program is found to constitute state aid, then a 
more fact-specific inquiry about the prevalence of religious versus general 
education at specific schools may be appropriate to determine the 
program’s federal constitutionality.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 Under the Montana Constitution, Rule 1’s constitutionality hinges 
primarily on the meaning of Mont. Const. Art. X, section 6. More 
specifically, the Court must decide whether tax credits constitute state 
funds, and whether, without Rule 1, they would provide indirect state aid 
to religious schools under this program. Federal constitutionality is tied to 
the nature of the scholarship program and what—or whom—it ultimately 
benefits: the public, or religious institutions. 
 
                                                          
56 Trinity, 137 S. Ct. at 2014. 
57 Id. at 2027. 
58 Id. at 2018. 
59 United States Amicus Brief at 15, Espinoza v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2017-0492%20Amicus%20--
%20Brief?id={70090B61-0000-CA1C-BE8A-4B82E18C81E4} (Jan. 18, 2018) (No. DA17-0492). 
